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Abstract 
 
Purpose: Noting that discussions of public participation and priority setting typically presuppose 
certain political theories of democracy, the paper discusses two such theories: the consensual and the 
agonistic.  The distinction is illuminating when considering the difference between institutionalized 
public participation and contestatory participation.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The approach is a theoretical reconstruction of two ways of 
thinking about public participation in relation to priority setting in health care, drawing on the work of 
Habermas, a deliberative theorist, and Mouffe, a theorist of agonism.  
 
Findings: The different theoretical approaches can be associated with different ways of understanding 
priority setting.  In particular, agonistic democratic theory would understand priority setting as system 
of inclusions and exclusions rather than the determination of a consensus of social values, which is the 
typical deliberative way of thinking about the issues. 
 
Originality/Value: The paper shows the value of drawing out explicitly the tacit assumptions of 
practices of political participation in order to reveal their scope and limitations.  It suggests that 
making such theoretical presuppositions explicit has value for health services management in 
recognizing these implicit choices. 
 
Keywords: Public participation, priority setting, deliberative democracy, agonistic democracy. 
 
Paper Type: Conceptual paper. 
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Between Consensus and Contestation in Priority Setting 
 
A striking feature of discussions about public participation and priority setting in health care is the 
extent to which they draw upon concepts and categories found in political theory.  For example, in her 
discussion of the relationship between public participation and public deliberation, Blacksher (2014: 4) 
cites the work of Chambers (2003: 309).  Public deliberation is seen as being aimed at securing 
legitimacy and the criteria of legitimacy are derived from deliberative democratic theory, requiring 
participation to be inclusive, equal, reasoned and voluntary.  In her analysis of the Israeli Health 
Parliament, Guttman (2007: 411) sees participative public deliberative practices as ways of creating 
the conditions of the ‘public sphere’ theorized in the work of Habermas.  Guttman uses this 
Habermasian characterization to evaluate how well the Health Parliament realized public deliberation 
in practice.  Oh et al. (2015) describe the moves towards the First Citizen Committee for Participation 
in South Korea as being inspired by ideas of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ as adumbrated in the 
work of Daniels and Sabin (2008).  Abelson et al. (2013: 4) locate the origins of experiments in public 
deliberation within the theory of deliberative democracy, noting that the legitimacy of the decisions at 
which public deliberation is aimed rests upon the participants being diverse, with each person having 
an equal opportunity to participate in discussion on the basis of non-partisan information. 
 
Political theories in public administration are typically used by analysts and policy-makers for two 
inter-related purposes.  The first is to explicate the rationale of practices like public participation.  The 
second is to stipulate the normative requirements for such practices by defining relevant evaluative 
criteria.  So, if deliberative theory is taken as the background theory for public involvement in 
decision making, then any actual example of public involvement can be evaluated by the extent to 
which it meets standards such as inclusiveness and adequate descriptive representation in the selection 
and facilitation of participants.   
 
These normative criteria of performance can also be extended to evaluate actual practices of policy 
making.  For example, from a deliberative perspective, there is a contrast to be made between policy 
processes in which lobbying dominates deliberation.  Deliberative criteria then provide the grounds to 
criticize existing processes as well as the rationale for a more open and inclusive alternative.  On such 
a view, only some forms of public participation are to be encouraged; others are at best a distraction 
and at worst a barrier to fair priority setting.  From this deliberative perspective, decision making 
should be detached from the influence of organized patient groups (patient ‘lobbies’) advancing their 
particular interests, in order to provide a forum within which broadly shared social values can be 
brought to bear on priority setting issues.  For example, it is sometimes argued, inclusive and 
representative minipublics, by contrast with patient protest groups, will take a dispassionate point of 
view judging issues from the standpoint of the citizen.  Public participation through formal 
representation or minipublics issues in negotiated consensus; contestatory participation issues in 
conflict.   
 
If the principles of deliberative democratic theory are privileged in this way, it follows that what is 
needed, in order to improve public participation in the management of priority setting, is a more 
thorough and rigorous application of the principles of deliberative democratic theory.  If deliberative 
theory is then linked to ideas of accountability for reasonableness, institutions and practices will need 
to be created in which reasonable views are expressed and channels of communication opened that 
foster negotiated consensus. 
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Yet this way of viewing the theoretical dimension of public participation is not the only one possible.  
As the analysis of cross-national patterns of public participation in this special issues of the Journal of 
Health Organization and Management shows (Slutsky et al., 2016), patterns of public participation 
exhibit considerable variation in the form and style that participation can take.  At one end there is 
institutionalized participation through the involvement of patient and public representatives as formal 
members on decision making bodies, as well as the use of minipublics.  Thus, NICE has strong 
institutionalized forms of public involvement.  At the opposite end are health systems like Brazil, 
Colombia, South Africa and South Korea in which participation takes a contestatory form, employing 
tactics of court proceedings, demonstrations, protests and direct lobbying.  It is, of course, possible to 
say that, where contestatory participation prevails, what is needed is an injection of deliberative 
democratic practices and norms.  Yet it is only feasible to implement particular normative principles 
provided certain conditions obtain.  A policy-making system that is in general exclusionary or that 
lacks the administrative capacity to deliver on even a basic level of service is also likely to be one in 
which the results of participatory decisions are marginalized or ignored.   
 
Concerns about the implementation of particular theoretical approaches and principles feed back into 
thinking about the rationale of participative practices.  Instead of taking the norms, criteria and 
principles of deliberative theory as having universal application, the concepts and categories of 
democratic theory can be seen as ways of characterizing the forms of participation specific to different 
political practices.  From this point of view, contestatory forms of participation may not of themselves 
be undemocratic, failing to meet standards of reasonable deliberation.  Rather they are a specific type 
of democratic response in a political situation in which reasonableness is for losers.  Whether public 
participation should be consensual or contestatory can only be decided once we have determined the 
appropriate way of theorizing the practices and institutions in which priority setting is embedded. 
 
This paper seeks to meet this challenge, posing the question of what alternative types of democratic 
theory are appropriate to different political circumstances.  It takes two paradigmatic theories - 
deliberative democracy as formulated by Habermas (1996) and agonistic democracy as formulated by 
Mouffe (2005) – as contrasting ways of theorizing the possible relationships between priority setting 
and public participation.  These two theories are not the only theoretical alternatives.  For example, 
among deliberative theorists there are competing views about the extent to which minipublics need to 
aim at consensus with some, like Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004) urging the deliberative theory 
can be formulated in cases of persistent and deep moral disagreement.  Similarly, among some 
agonistic theorists, like Tully (2005; 2008), open deliberation is a way of dealing with difference.  
However, the sharply contrasting character of deliberative and agonist democracy in the work of 
Habermas and Mouffe provides a finely etched contrast of perspective that makes it possible to see 
more clearly how different modes of public participation may be best theorized. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 gives a brief account of Habermas’s theory of deliberative 
democracy.  Section 2 introduces Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy in which identity is always 
a matter of difference, and according to which the contestatory role of democratic action is seen as 
central.  Section 3 draws out the implications for these two lines of analysis for our thinking about 
public participation and priority setting, noting that we cannot expect democracy in health policy to 
compensate for the lack of democracy in the political system at large. 
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1. Deliberative Democratic Theory 
 
Within the perspective of deliberative democracy, a number of theorists take consensus as central to 
legitimate decision making.  For example, Cohen (1989: 22) writes that political outcomes are 
legitimate ‘if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned agreement among equals’.  
Similarly Dryzek (2001: 651) holds that ‘outcomes are legitimate to the extent to which they receive 
assent through participation by all those subject to the decision in question’.  Such ideas are found in 
the design of participative deliberative processes.  Thus Guttman (2007: 418-22) shows how in the 
Israeli Health Parliament measures were taken to ensure fairness in recruitment procedures, access to 
information and stipulations of competence, as well as procedures to ensure an inclusive discursive 
process, conditions necessary to secure agreement by participants on an equal footing and in a free 
and reasoned way.  In this tradition of thinking, Habermas has offered an important and influential 
theory of deliberative democracy in which the idea of consensus is central, not as an incidental 
element of theory but as crucial to its basic construction.  In turn, his theoretical construction has 
important implications for practices of public participation, as well as having been influential on 
theorists of minipublics like Dryzek (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008).   
 
Habermas’s account of deliberative democracy is a theory of what gives legitimacy to public 
decisions and policies, where legitimacy means that the norms embodied in those decisions and 
policies provide justifiable grounds of public action.  At the core of his view is the discourse principle 
defined as follows: 
 
‘According to the discourse principle, just those norms deserves to be valid that could meet 
with the approval of those potentially affected, insofar as the latter participate in rational 
discourses.’ (Habermas, 1996: 127). 
 
In other words, for a norm - a guide as to policy decision-making - to be justifiable, it must be one to 
which all those affected by the policy could agree.  Consensus is not simply a desirable feature of 
policy making; it is the only basis upon which public policy can legitimately be made. 
 
It is part of the deep background to this theory that there are no objectively right or wrong answers to 
questions of public policy and public choice (Weale, 2007: 83-90).  Legislation cannot identify the 
right policy apart from the process of public dialogue that gives rise to a social consensus.  However, 
a legitimating consensus requires certain conditions to be met in the process of deliberation, involving 
constraints on how the public dialogue is to be conducted.  In this context, Habermas distinguishes 
between what he calls strategic rationality on the one hand and communicative rationality on the other.  
Strategic rationality is typical of situations in which people bargain with one another.  For example, 
two people negotiating over the price of a house are looking to find agreement, but each is still 
interested in securing the best deal possible from an individual point of view.  By contrast, 
communicative rationality is a frame of mind in which the parties to a disagreement are looking to 
express the grounds of their beliefs as honestly as possible, with the aim of persuading the other 
person to see their point of view but also with a willingness to change their own minds if the other 
side comes up with relevant considerations.  According to Habermas, when citizens are debating the 
ends of collective action in ways that secure legitimacy, they should be understood in engaging in an 
exercise of communicative rationality, seeking for mutual understanding from a common point of 
view.   
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It is not hard to see why such ideas attract policy makers concerned with the setting of health care 
priorities.  Many of the questions that are raised by priority setting do not have clear and obvious 
answers.  Should there be special consideration for children when evaluating health benefits?  What is 
the role of personal responsibility in decisions on resource allocation?  How much it is reasonable to 
pay for a therapy that promises to extend life in the last few months of someone’s life?  Is it relevant 
that a therapy will increase the chance of some patients returning to work, when other therapies are 
primarily of benefit to the retired?  Because these questions have no obvious right answers, the most 
plausible basis of legitimation seems to be that of consensus.  If people can agree on the answers, 
particularly where people who stand to lose from any decision can agree in recognising valid 
competing claims from their own, then those formulating policies have a claim to legitimacy in their 
decisions by reference to that consensus.  Emerging from a process of communicative interaction, 
negotiated consensus seems an attractive basis for public action where there is no simple right answer. 
 
Deliberative theory is not simply a way of deriving principles for the design of deliberative practices 
and institutions.  It is also a way of thinking about the general political processes by which decisions 
are made, the deliberative system (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012), in which there is a division of 
labour between citizens and their political representatives.  Unless citizens’ deliberation effectively 
feeds in to representative systems of government, then the promise of deliberative theory will be lost.  
This does not mean, however, that an effective deliberative system is organized by the political 
authorities.  Habermas (1996: Chapter 8) himself stresses the role of autonomous civil society groups, 
who are relatively independent of state institutions and authority, in the public opinion forming 
process.  Such groups operate alongside formal institutions, for example political party representatives 
voting in a parliament, identifying new issues for the political agenda and providing a critique of 
existing policies.  Nevertheless, social and policy consensus is the goal by which public participation 
should be judged. 
 
 
2. Agonistic Democracy 
 
A consensus emerging from processes of public participation may be premature if it too easily closes 
down political controversy.  For example, Blacksher (2013: 2-3) has drawn attention to a radical 
strand of thought in which public participation is seen as a form of citizen power, concerned to give 
voice to those excluded from effective decision making, rather than a form of institutionalized 
deliberation.  Stewart (2016) has stressed the role of ‘uninvited’ participation alongside ‘invited’ 
participation in the making of decisions.  Sluksky et al. (2016) have drawn attention to the central role 
of contestatory participation in societies like Brazil, Colombia and South Africa.  In some cases, the 
interaction of civil society and the state is not one of shared deliberation about a common form of 
public life.  Rather it takes the form of a critique of exclusion.  If that form of participation is to be 
theorized, then it will be necessary to draw upon theories of agonistic democracy of the sort found in 
the work of Chantal Mouffe. 
 
By contrast with theorists of democratic consensus, Mouffe is a theorist of difference.  Her starting 
point is that any modern democracy is irreducibly plural.  It contains different groups with their own 
moral and political perspectives.  Moreover, these groups have their own identities.  Such different 
identities cannot be merged into an overall social identity, because the creation of an identity implies 
the establishment of difference, so that any ‘we’ can only exist in opposition to a ‘they’ (Mouffe, 2005: 
15).  It follows that ‘the possibility of a universal rational consensus has put democratic thinking on 
the wrong track’ (Mouffe, 2005: 3).  What is needed is not the design of impartial institutional 
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procedures, capable of reconciling conflicting interests and values, but the creation of a public sphere 
in which different political projects can confront one another, advocating their respective claims.  
From this point of view, an idea like ‘good governance’, sometimes associated with the fostering of 
public involvement,  is an anti-political notion, seeking to erase irreducible differences present in 
society rather than acknowledge them (Mouffe, 2005: 2). 
 
One of Mouffe’s principal concerns is that any putative consensus will always in practice be a form of 
intellectual and political hegemony excluding certain perspectives, whilst pretending at the same time 
to be general and impartial.  Behind this claim is a more general view that social groups can only 
realise that they stand in a relation of oppression to a social order if they have access to an alternative 
way of thinking.  For example, serfs can only thing of themselves as oppressed if they have access to 
a vocabulary of equal rights (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 154).  Since identities are irreducibly plural, a 
dominant set of identities within a social order will always exclude another set of identities.  To 
suppose otherwise is to ignore the role of power in the way that politics and policy are constituted. 
 
On this account, deliberative democracy makes a mistake in seeking to moralize political decision 
making.  For Mouffe, such a rationalist and moralistic notion is called into question by the fact that 
politics is always potentially characterized by the logic of the friend/enemy distinction (Mouffe, 2005: 
13-14), which creates political antagonism.  Such a relation between friend and enemy can be 
redefined so that it becomes a contest of adversaries rather than enemies.  Relations of political 
antagonism thus become relations of political agonism in which adversarial contest replaces the 
opposition of enemies.  Unlike enemies, adversaries share assumptions about the basis of the political 
order, accepting the basic principles of democracy on such matters as political equality.  However, 
these same assumptions will also require them to acknowledge that democracy is about allowing 
conflict and not imposing an authoritarian order (Mouffe, 2005: 30). 
 
This agonism, it is claimed, acknowledges the role of mass political movements and the passions that 
they exhibit (Mouffe, 2005: 24), forming a contrast with a deliberative democracy that aims at an 
impartial and dispassionate politics.  Agonistic democracy sees the passions of mobilization, 
politicization and conflictual representations of the world as central to the democratic project.  It is 
social movements that provide pluralism within a political order, particularly social movements like 
feminism and anti-racism.  In Mouffe’s view these movements define their identities in we/they terms.  
However, although such groups are her principal examples, there is no reason why her conception of 
identity should not be extended to groups defined by their relation to health care: those concerned 
with children’s health as distinct from those concerned with the health of adults; those suffering long-
term conditions as against those with acute conditions; those suffering from AIDS; or those with 
mental illness. 
 
What would it imply for the politics of priority setting to understand it as built upon this agonistic 
account of democracy?  Mouffe has not herself discussed the politics of priority setting, but her 
concept of agonism suggests the following.  From an agonistic point of view, the setting of priorities 
is not a matter of producing a rank-ordering of cost-effective interventions, defined impartially.  
Rather it would be a system of inclusions and exclusions.  One type of inclusion or exclusion would 
relate to which interventions – whether they be pharmaceuticals, medical devices or other procedures 
- were either covered or not covered for reimbursement.  However, exclusions might also extend to 
types of patients, for example the elderly or those thought to have brought illness upon themselves, 
the latter being an element in such cases as sofosbuvir for Hepatitis C (Kieslich et al., 2016).  
Inclusions and exclusions also need to be determined in respect of the types of evidence that would 
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count in favour or against the coverage of an intervention, as well as to what counted as illness rather 
than a matter of social care, disability or infertility.  On this account, those who manage priority 
setting are no longer the servants of a negotiated and agreed consensus in the public interest.  Rather 
their function is to police a system of inclusions and exclusions. 
 
Because the source of these inclusions and exclusions is to be found in the dominant or hegemonic 
paradigm of decision making, for agonistic theorists all the presuppositions of the decision making 
paradigm are subject to political contestation.  Consider, for example, the prices charged for 
pharmaceuticals as an element in the decision on priorities.  On the agonistic account, pharmaceutical 
prices are not natural givens but stem from rules of intellectual property, the influence of regulatory 
regimes as well as accounting conventions about such matters as write-offs for losses, investment tax 
allowances and cross-product subsidy.  These social constructions underlie the inclusions and 
exclusions that shape priority setting.  As such they are potentially open to political challenge.  
Similarly, applying principles of cost-effectiveness to prioritise interventions presupposes that is it 
possible to generate a social consensus about such matters as relative rankings of the quality of life 
and the commensurability of health gain across many different conditions.  Such assumptions are 
frequently built into the routine processes of health technology assessment.  However, as the 
experience of HIV/AIDS drugs in many societies has shown, decisions on particular interventions can 
trigger contestation over such tacit assumptions.  In this way, an agonistic account of democracy 
theorizes how the scope of political conflict is sometimes widened in respect of inclusions and 
exclusions by particular issues that call into play significant identity formations. 
 
From the agonistic perspective, the use of minipublics in priority setting risks exclusion through 
agenda-setting, another form of hegemony.  Minipublics are the epitome of what Stewart (2016) has 
labelled ‘invited’ participation.  Those who offer the invitation are also the ones who organized the 
event, with consequent control of process and procedure (Gul, 2015).  The initial agenda is defined for 
participants; minipublic events usually take place under conditions designed to soften rather than 
enhance difference; briefing materials and the experts used will inevitably reflect only partial 
understandings of complex situations; and limitations of time and resources will always result in the 
exclusion of various, and dissenting, voices.  As organized events, their character will reflect the 
bureaucratic rationality that led to their establishment. An example of these effects is provided by the 
Israeli Health Parliament, which asked citizens to deliberate on priorities on the assumption of a fixed 
budget.  Some participants rejected this starting-point, as in the following quotation from one 
participant shows: 
 
‘I say that we don’t have to speak from the logic that we need to follow what we are asked to 
do.  We need to decide from our own conscience if to give funding to an expensive treatment 
for a patient or abandon him.’ (cited in Gutmann, 2007: 427) 
 
As Guttman points out, such attempts to reject the given framework of discussion were in turn 
rejected by other participants.  From an agonistic point of view, the rejection of the rejection 
exemplifies the logic of inclusions and exclusions. 
 
Given that identities can only be articulated by those that share them, the agonistic democrat is likely 
to place more faith in autonomous patient movements, political campaigns and the mobilization of 
movements than in administratively organized public deliberation.  An example would include South 
Africa’s Treatment Action campaign seeking to gain access to HIV/AIDS therapies (Slutsky, et al. 
2016).  The Campaign’s use of the South African constitutional right to health was both a focal point 
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for mobilization and a case of agonistic, rather than antagonistic, political action.  It presupposed 
acceptance of the basic constitutional order of society, and so was not premised on the distinction of 
friend/enemy.  It did contest how an agreed basis of democracy was being interpreted, the precise way 
in which inclusions and exclusions were constructed. 
 
 
3. Consensus or Agonism? 
 
It can be argued that the contrast between deliberative and agonistic theories of democracy is less 
sharp than has been presented so far. For example, some agonistic theorists like Tully (2005, 2008) 
see deliberation in minipublics as a way of opening up technical and other forms of decision making 
to political contestation (compare Wingenbach, 2011), although this line of argument is challenged 
from the agonistic perspective (Wenman, 2013: 162).   In more theoretical terms, Mouffe’s appeal to 
some underlying procedural consensus that turns enemies into adversaries and the use of language in 
contestation can be argued to presuppose some discursive agreement (Knops, 2007).  Yet, to say that 
there is overlap is not to say that there is similarity at a deep level.  The contrasting ways in which 
deliberative and agonistic accounts theorize public participation reflects the way in which agonistic 
theory offers an irreducibly conflictual view of the political world by contrast with deliberative theory 
(Gürsözlu, 2009).   
 
What implications do these differences in democratic theory carry for the organization of public 
participation in relation to priority setting?   One implication is the need to pay attention to the way in 
which institutionalized participation, either in minipublics or through appointed public representatives, 
relates to the understanding of public opinion.  Public opinion can be thought of in various ways, but 
it distorts the priority setting agenda if it is only seen through its construction in questionnaire 
responses or through the deliberated responses of minipublics.  It may be, for example, that the 
mobilization of patient groups around access to therapies biases a policy process that in less 
passionate circumstances would reject the claims made by such groups.  On the other hand, such 
mobilization is one form of public opinion that is no less authentic than the construction of public 
opinion through devices like opinion surveys or deliberative events. 
 
In this respect there is one important way in which deliberative and agonistic theory overlap.  Just as 
some agonistic theorist embrace minipublics, so a deliberative theorist like Habermas sees an 
important opinion-forming role for autonomous political movements within civil society.  Although 
Habermas does not conceive of the logic of social movement organization as agonistic, his model 
allows for a transformation of politics when currents of thought, previously outside the sphere of 
routine politics, contest the normal order and establish their concerns in the political or parliamentary 
system.  This was the pattern of German environmental politics from the late 1960s to the 1980s, in 
which the so called ‘citizens’ initiatives’ mobilized around questions of town planning, redevelopment 
and traffic management (Weale, 1992: 168).  These civil society movements contributed to a 
transformation of environmental politics and policy.  By analogy, it is not difficult to see a political 
logic by which disillusion with the high costs of medical care transforms itself into social mobilization 
to improve public health particularly in respect of such matters as air pollution, food security and 
access to recreational space. 
 
Mouffe’s distinction between agonism and antagonism draws attention to the conditions that need to 
be in place for broad civic participation is to make legitimate priority setting decisions.  Agonism 
requires that there be some consensus on the rules of the game if not on the substantive decisions.  In 
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the societies in which contestatory participation is the norm, the conditions of democratic 
consolidation, including the socio-economic securities that underlie meaningful democratic 
participation are absent.  Where the security of economic and social rights is lacking, even when 
promised in the constitution, it is not surprising that participation is contestatory rather than 
consensual.  As such, it is better theorized through the concepts of agonistic democracy than through 
the ideals of deliberative democracy.  In particular, it should not be assumed that creating islands of 
deliberative democracy in a society in which the broader social and economic rights of citizenship are 
insecure will enhance the legitimacy of priority setting.   
 
In this context, the administrative capacity of the state is crucial.  Democratic participation is only 
effective insofar as there is a relatively efficient and uncorrupt state administration to carry into effect 
the will of the public.  Ineffective state structures will compromise the ability to appraise interventions, 
raise revenue, shape investments and ensure that services are provided in line with public needs and 
preferences.  Good management and organization are at the heart of any attempts to ensure that public 
participation plays a role in priority setting.  If public participation is to be transformative, then health 
care organization and management will need to create the conditions in which meaningful 
participation is possible, whilst always being sensitive to the democratic categories and concepts that 
infuse the actions of policy makers. 
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